Introduction: Religion, Democracy, and the
Cultural Tradition Argument
To some extent, current discussions about the
relationship between religion and democracy have reached the level
of a “stereotypical discourse,” arguing that the former is inimical
to the latter. At least – in so far as these stereotypical
discourses have developed – religion and democracy are said to be
inherently and organically incompatible. They are contradictory in
character and nature, especially when placed in the context of
democracy as a modern governance mechanism, and especially if we
relate this to Francis Fukuyama’s prophesy that liberal democracy is
the final destination of humanity’s ideological evolution and the
final form of government, and thus “the end of history.”1
The perception that religion and democracy are
“incompatible” arises, in part, from what Olivier Roy calls the
“political imagination” of a religious community. In an Islamic
context, this political imagination can lead to the belief that the
domains of religion, law and politics are inseparable. To complement
this belief, shari’a, writes Roy, “should be the sole source
of law as well as the norm for individual behavior, both for the
sovereign and the simple believer.” Therefore, he continues, “[t]he
definition of an autonomous political space, with its own rule, its
positive laws, and its own values is prohibited.” This view can be
summarized with the words “the state is never considered in terms of
a territorialized nation-state; the ideal is to have a political
power that would rule over the entire of the umma, the
community of the faithful ..."2
The story of this “incompatibility” is not the
sole monopoly of Islam. St. Augustine's deterministic theological
views offer a somewhat comparable “political imagination.” As
Herbert A. Dean has written, St. Augustine theologically justified
the use of political force to combat – hatta – religious
thoughts that were perceived to conflict with existing mainstream
beliefs. The African Denotist community, whose members were labeled
heretics and khurafat, were on the receiving end of this
view. In the same vein, St. Augustine also believed in the supremacy
of God’s law above human law. Therefore, he concluded that
establishing a theocracy is mandatory.3
More recently, the religious-social movements
united in the Christian Right in the United States represent a
similar phenomenon – although packaged in a more suitable form for
contemporary consumption. Using modern communications technologies,
and led by important figures like Jerry Falwell, James Robinson and
Pat Robertson, the Christian Right campaigns for a “conservative”
political agenda. In the fifties and sixties, its predecessors even
allied with the anti-communist McCarthyist movement. The main tone
of this movement is fundamentalist, racist and anti-Semitic, and
intolerant of civil freedom movements in general. Therefore, they
are often viewed as an obstacle to democratic sociopolitical life.4
Jose Casanova found similar tendencies in his
study of Catholic and Protestant revitalization in the political and
socioeconomic spheres in Spain, Poland, Brazil and the United
States. His study concludes that potential incompatibility between
religion and democracy exists in both Catholic and Protestant
religious traditions – although this does not automatically reflect
the religions’ basic nature.5
Thus, it is “perplexing” that Samuel P.
Huntington’s thesis singled out Islam and Confucianism as religions
that are culturally inimical to democracy. He wrote, “’Confucian
democracy’ is clearly a contradiction in terms. It is unclear
whether ‘Islamic democracy’ is.”6
In fact, Huntington’s position regarding Islam
is ambiguous. He does not explicitly state that Islam is
anti-democratic. Referring to Ernest Gellner, Huntington notes that
egalitarianism and voluntarism are among Islam’s central themes.
Again referring to findings in Gellner’s study, Huntington observes
that Islam has a “high culture” with some characteristics that are
compatible with the principles of democracy. The various forms of
Islamic high culture include unitarianism, ethics, individualism,
scripturalism, puritanism, and egalitarianism. Perhaps this is why
Huntington is unsure whether or not Islam rejects the separation of
religion and politics. Indeed, like the view presented at the
beginning of this essay, Huntington believes that fundamentalist
Muslims demand a country’s sovereignty be in the hands of pious
Muslims; that shari’a be the law; and clergy have the final
say on every public policy formulation.
In fact, this stereotypical social-cultural
view stems not only from some people’s perception and assessment
that Islam is culturally inimical to democracy. It also stems from
the West’s bias – if not arrogance – in claiming its region as the
heartland of democracy. The line of thinking that developed in this
context is that cultural tradition plays an important role in
building democracy—especially concerning attitudes, values, beliefs
and behaviors. According to this school of thought, as formulated by
Robert A. Dahl, political activists’ belief in solving problems
democratically is an important ingredient in developing the actual
practice of democracy.8 Thus, according to George Kenna,
only the West has a cultural tradition compatible with democratic
values. This is one of the reasons that democracy first developed in
the West—in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in northwestern
Europe, especially in countries bordering the English Channel and
the North Sea (e.g. England, Netherlands, etc). In subsequent
development, this democratic area expanded to include North America
(i.e., the U.S. and Canada) – whose residents had immigrated from
northwestern Europe. It is this combination of origins and cultural
traditions that later caused some people to believe that democracy
is only suitable for the people of Western Europe and North America.9
In light of generalized views like these, it is
understandable that some parties fail to incorporate certain
religious or cultural regions in the democratization projects that
have increased in the last two decades. Experts like Larry Diamond,
Juan Linza and Seymour Martin Lipset – to mention just a few –
believe that certain religious regions (i.e. the Islamic world, the
Middle East) are unsuitable for democratization, because empirically
they do not have adequate experience with the democratic process.
They believe that it would be difficult for these regions to
undertake the transitional process towards democracy.10
Anyone can argue for any culture’s
advantage in developing a democratic life. But this cannot negate
the fact that many “non-European” countries can and have developed
democracy. The transitional process towards democracy over the last
twenty years has involved many countries in Latin America, Africa
and Asia. Of course, these do not construct the same forms of
democratic life – neither in level nor intensity – as those
practiced by their counterparts in Western Europe and North America.
This (i.e., variations in realizing a democratic life), is a common
situation. T.J. Pemple calls this phenomenon – referring to
developments in Japan, Israel, and several Scandinavian countries –
uncommon democracies.11
This long introduction is intended to state
that the relationship between religion and democracy should be
examined from many angles, beginning with religious doctrines. But
we should also recognize that not all religions embrace the
principle of “religious hierarchy,” especially concerning the degree
of truth of any given understanding. This means that interpretations
of religious teachings can differ – as long as they represent a
responsible effort. If one uses this approach, it is immediately
clear that there are various interpretations within any given
religion or sect, each with its own social-political implications.
By adopting this kind of approach, we can truly identify which or
what kinds of religious beliefs are compatible or incompatible with
democracy. In the Islamic context, it is interesting to read
Michael Hudson’s verifiable and non-generalizing question: “[h]ow
much and what kinds of Islam are compatible with (or necessary for)
political development in the Muslim world?”12
Islam and Democracy: Looking For Family
Resemblances
It may have been due to a sense of "academic
obligation" that Gellner "finds" that Islam has some family
resemblances with democracy. The same is true of Robert N. Bellah’s
conclusion that the form of governance Muhammad developed in Madinah
was egalitarian and participative. Bellah was so impressed that he
dared to consider what the Prophet did too modern for his time. Due
to a lack of resources – more than the necessary political
infrastructure – the democratic “engineering” failed to survive.
“It was too modern to succeed,” wrote Bellah.13
Both Gellner and Bellah conclude that Islam is
compatible with democracy, based on their research into Islamic
political doctrines and practices. Doctrines concerning justice (al-‘adl),
egalitarianism (al-musâwah) and negotiation (syurâ)
were applied in the early Islamic practice of state politics in ways
that are deemed modern. Modern, due to the commitment, involvement
and participation of the whole political community in Madinah. The
political structure that developed was also modern, in that there
was openness in choosing a leader, based on meritocracy, instead of
hereditary principles.14 This form of modernity is viewed
as being comparable with democratic political life.
Although Islam exhibits sociopolitical
principles that are in line with the general principles of
democracy, many people still question how far Islamic teachings as a
whole are truly consonant with democratic values. A comprehensive
answer to this question requires an examination of the entirety of
Islamic teaching, be it socio-cultural, economic, or political – an
even the ritualistic hatta. Theoretically, this is possible.
But in practice, such an approach would be an exhausting task. There
is another alternative—for the purpose of a quick examination –
namely, questioning Islam’s general position in a man’s life and how
its adherents “treat” the teachings codified in their references –
the Qur’an and Sunnah.
In this context, it may be said that religion
is a divine instrument through which to understand the world.
Humanity needs guidance to wade through life on earth. It is not
difficult for Islam to accept such a premise. One of the main
reasons is because Islam is omnipresent. That is, wherever a Muslim
may be, Islam should serve as the guide for his or her conduct.
It is fair to say that Muslims generally
believe in the holistic nature of Islam. As an instrument for
understanding life, Islam is often considered to be something more
than a mere religion. Some see it as a “civil society.” Some
consider it to be a “comprehensive system of civilization.” Some
even believe it to be the unity of “religion and state.” Behind
these formulations is a general view that Islam is more than a mere
ritualistic and/or theological system. In particular, Islam does not
recognize the separation between the spiritual and the temporal –
although the two domains can be distinguished. On the contrary,
Islam offers an ethical guide for all aspects of life.15
While the Islamic community believes in this
holistic nature of Islam, how this is articulated – not necessarily
because of differences in the level and intensity of piety, but
rather because the character of Islamic teachings allow for
differences in interpretation – is more problematic. Some tend to
understand the holistic nature of Islam organically, meaning that
the relationship between Islam and every aspect of life should be
legalistic and formal. On the other hand, some see the totality of
Islam in a more substantive dimension, where content, rather than
form, becomes the primary reference for the social life of Islamic
society. The failure to harmonize these two very different
tendencies complicates the effort to create a synthesis between
Islam and the state – and in fact represents the dominant factor in
such difficulties.16
Regardless, it is important to note that Islam
does not address every issue in detail. If my reading of the Quranic
verses is correct, then it can be said that Islam offers guidance
regarding values, morals and ethics in a global form. Therefore,
Islam strongly emphasizes the use of reason, through the process of
ijtihad. If the Qur’an already contained everything and every
detail, it would be difficult for Muslims to perform ijtihad.
The emphasis and appreciation for the ijtihad concept is
reflected in the dictum that whoever is wrong in ijtihad
gains one merit; whoever is right, gains two merits.17
This is also the case when we speak about the
relationship between Islam and politics; Islam and democracy; or
Islam and civil society. The Qur’an offers only wisdom, not a
detailed concept about society, politics or state. It leaves the
details for Muslim thinkers and activists to formulate, according to
the environment in which they live. Thus, the structure of society,
politics and state in one Muslim region differs from that of other
Islamic regions, as do the problems they face. Nevertheless, it must
be said that the basic principle is the same. And this basic
principle has a role to serve as the essential nucleus in the
development of civil society or democratic politics.
In keeping with the view that the Qur’an offers
overall guidance, it does not suggest conceptions (including in the
field of politics) in detail. The Qur’an, as Qamaruddin Khan has
stated, is not a book about politics. If that is the case, in what
ways does the Qur’an address the life of the modern state, the life
of democratic politics, or the need to build civil society as part
of operating a democratic state and government?
Some experts believe that Islam merely provides
the general principles of political life that must be followed by
its adherents. Muhammad’s experience in Madinah, as referenced
above, demonstrates this. The Qur’an has explicitly outlined several
of these principles, such as justice (al-‘adl),
egalitarianism (al-musaqh); and negotiation (syurâ).
Although only a few principles are explicitly outlined, these
teachings are repeatedly expressed in the Qur’an. Sometimes the
substance of these doctrines is stated in other terms—in
complimentary or opposing forms, like the prohibition to oppress
other people—the opposite of the injunction to be just.
So Islam clearly contains basic teachings that
are consistent with the principles of democracy. As an instrument to
understand the world, how can the Quran offer conflicting advice? If
Islam is meant to bring humanity from “ignorance” to “civilization”;
from “darkness” to “light”; from al-zhulumat to al-nur,
then the structure of its doctrines cannot possibly be incoherent.
Therefore, Huntington’s ambiguity about Islam’s compatibility with
democracy (as previously mentioned) must be rooted in how certain
doctrines are interpreted—especially those concerning social
affairs. As long as Islamic teachings or principles regarding social
affairs are stated substantially, and not in a
legalistic/formalistic manner, the congruence between Islam and
democracy will be clear. The experience of the Madinah “state” is a
classic example of this—which failed only because of the weak
infrastructure available to its proponents (and thus represents an
issue of political crafting).
Islam and Indonesian Democratic Politics:
Legalism/Formalism vs Substantialism
The above-mentioned frame of reference will
help us to reconstruct the relationship between Islam and democratic
politics in modern Indonesia. Modern Indonesian Islamic thinkers and
political activists realize that Islamic teachings are compatible
with the principles of democratic state life. This includes the
early generation of Indonesian Islamic intellectuals and activists,
such Mohammad Natsir. As is evident from his and others’ writings,
most of Natsir’s political struggles were directed towards realizing
the idea of a state construct and a mechanism for governing it,
based on theo-democracy. The word “theo” attached to democracy
reflects Natsir’s loyalty to the teachings of his religion, Islam.
In this sense, Natsir emerges as a figure who was aware of the
holistic nature of Islam on the one hand, and its omnipresence on
the other.19
But Natsir’s tendency to regard Islam as
holistic and omnipresent has more or less obfuscated his ideas about
the relationship between Islam and democracy. Like the ambiguity
prevalent in many circles, including Huntington’s, Natsir’s Islamic
interpretation overwhelmed his thoughts about (Islamic) democracy.
It can be extrapolated that Natsir’s view of a holistic and
omnipresent Islam requires its adherents to relate Islam to all
aspects of life in a legalistic and formalistic way—including state
politics. The essence of Islamic doctrine is that each adherent
bases his life on the values of its teachings. This means that all
policies he formulates must not conflict with Islam. The way an
Islamic community bases its life on religious teachings is
“technical,” with its various forms molded according to the
surrounding circumstances. Forms existing in one region are of
course different from the forms that emerge in other regions. Even
between one Muslim and another, there can be differences in how they
base their lives on Islamic teachings. It is this “technical”
problem that has served as an internal barrier, inhibiting the
Indonesian Islamic community from realizing a democratic political
life—although it must be understood that this barrier does not exist
only in the Islamic political community
Exhaustive debates in the Konstituante
[Indonesia’s constitutional assembly], especially in formulating a
constitution that aspired to secure what Adnan Buyung Nasution calls
a “constitutional government,” failed—from the point of view of
people “outside” Islam—because of this “technical” problem, among
others. Considering that the Konstituante managed to finish
much work (ninety percent of it, according to reports; the only
problem being the country’s basic principles!), this assessment
about the “technical” factor having been one of the determining
factors in its ultimate failure can be further justified. How could
the Konstituante reach a collective decision about the
content of a constitution, when they had not yet agreed upon its
basic principles? This reality demonstrates that the differences
between the “religious group” and the “nationalist group” were
primarily legalistic/formalistic, rather than substantive. In this
context, it is accurate to say that these legalistic and formalistic
elements helped defeat the possibility of Indonesia adopting a
constitutional government.20
Indonesia experienced a short democratic
political life that only lasted from 1950-59. Weak socio-economic
conditions and infrastructure contributed to this short-lived
democracy. Moreover, the nation’s political elite had not
transformed from a disunified elite to a consensually unified
elite—a condition that made it difficult for them to reach a
consensus in their negotiations.21 All of this
contributed to the list of barriers inhibiting democratic political
life in Indonesia.22
The period after President Soekarno’s decree
(1959) to return to the 1945 Constitution—which eliminated the need
for the Konstituante—was never typified by the existence of a
democratic political life. President Soekarno’s and President
Soeharto’s administrations were basically authoritative, and not
competitive. What distinguishes the two is economic development—with
all its socio-political implications—which proceeded relatively
quickly under Soeharto’s administration.23
Given this kind of playing field, the
relationship between Islam and political democracy was merely an
issue of “speculative” discourse, which was not transformed or
materialized in the real world. Nevertheless, this speculative
discourse was not devoid of significance—not in the sense of
creating a genuinely democratic life, but rather as an intellectual
exercise that was useful to prepare the ground rules and
relationship between various groups of would-be democratizers when
the time came.
This preparation of ground rules was developed
by Islamic political thinkers and activists who emerged in the
1970s. What they did was not directly related to democratic
life. Rather, the political ideas and practices developed since that
decade are meant to be remedial steps to bridge the relationship
between Islam and the state – a relationship that has become so
antagonistic and hostile, with all the implications thereto, because
of the articulation of old legalistic/formalistic political ideas
and practices.24
It is a mere historical “coincidence” that the
transformation of Islamic political thought and practice, which has
been developing in Indonesia for over two decades, is compatible
with the spirit and structure of a democratic political life. This
transformation of Islamic political thoughts and practices is marked
by a paradigm shift that is more substance-oriented than
symbols-oriented; based on meaning, rather than form or pro forma.
If this “substantialism” is the primary indicator of Indonesia’s
altered Islamic paradigm, then what will develop are Islamic
socio-political ideas that are more universal than particular in
nature.
It was thus that what came to be known as a
“common platform” developed in Indonesia. At this stage, the new
“religious community” politics—if this term can be used as an
equivalent for Islamic politics—is aimed towards developing the
substance, content or “concrete meaning” dimension of Islamic
politics. With the development of this kind of political discourse
and practice, the symbolic-ideological nuances—which were not only
rejected, but also became a source of political antagonism towards
Islam—can be avoided. This is what can change the old patterns of
Islamic political thought and activity—including both conception
(dreams and aspirations) and practice (methods, instruments and
tools to realize those aspirations).25
If this line of argument is valid, it means
that only transformed Islamic thoughts and practices will be
highly compatible with democracy. In other words, the relationship
or dialogue between Islam and democracy—in the Indonesian
context—will occur to the extent that the former (Islam) is
articulated in a more substantial way.
Closing: The Existence of Religion in
Indonesian Politics
The above explanation – despite its theme of
“Islam and democracy” – demonstrates the importance of religion’s
position in the life of the state, whether social, economic or
political. This means that it’s practically impossible to separate
religious life from that of the state. This remark should not be
misunderstood to imply a desire to “unite” religion and the state.
It is only meant to show how difficult (how impossible) it would be
to separate worldly activities – whether directly or indirectly,
consciously or unconsciously – from the influence of religious
values.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the
religious and worldly domains cannot be distinguished.
Identifying the nature and character of each domain is
necessary, so that problems that emerge can be accurately diagnosed
and treated, because the problem is clear and not confusing.
Although one might preface a meal with a religious blessing (e.g.,
bismillahirrahmanirrahim), eating and drinking are still in
the domain of worldly activities. On the other hand, although they
have a high social meaning, paying alms or fasting are in the domain
of religious activities. In this context, religion – not in the
sense of rites, but in the sense of social teachings – is not simply
a private domain, but also a public domain. Jose Casanova refers to
this concept as “the deprivatization of religion.”26
In light of this, it is clear that politics in
Indonesia cannot be separated from Islam. The Islamic community
itself cannot engage in political activities completely devoid of
religious influence. But it must be noted that the inextricable
relationship between religion (Islam) and politics/state (Indonesia)
does not necessarily have to assume a mechanical pattern. The two
can relate through a substantialist or deconfessionalist model – a
tendency that is more oriented towards meaning and substance.
Endnotes
1 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the
Last Man, New York: The Free Press, 1992, p. xi.
2 Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam,
translated by Carol Volk, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994.
3 Herbert A. Dean, The Political and Social Ideas
of St. Augustine, New York and London: Columbia University
Press, 1963.
4 James Davison Hunter, “Conservative
Protestantism,” in Phillip E. Hammond (ed.), The Sacred in a
Secular Age, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.
5 Jose Casanova, Public Religion in the Modern
World, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994.
6 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave:
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman and
London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, p. 307.
7 Ernest Gellner, “Up From Imperialism,” The New
Republic, May 22, 1989, p. 35-36. Quoted from Samuel P.
Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century, p. 307.
8 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and
Opposition, New Haven: Yale University Pres, 1971.
9 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave:
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman and
London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, p. 298-299.
10 See Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, Seymour Martin
Lipset (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries, Boulder,
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989, p.xx.
11 TJ Pemple (ed.), Uncommon Democracies: The
One-Party Dominant Regimes, Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 1990.
12 Michael C. Hudson, “Islam and Political
Development,” in John L. Esposito (ed.), Islam and Development,
Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1980.
13 Robert N. Bellah, “Islamic Tradition and the
Problem of Modernization,” in his collection of essays Beyond
Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditionalist World,
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, p. 151.
14 Robert N. Bellah, “Islamic Tradition and the
Problem of Modernization,” p. 150-151.
15 Fazlur Rahman, Islam, New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston, 1966.
16 Leonard Binder, The Ideological Revolution in
the Middle East, New York: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company,
1979.
17 See Munawir Syadzali, Islam dan Tatanegara:
Ajaran, Sejarah, dan Pemikiran, Jakarta: UI Press, 1990.
18 For more specific information, see for example
Muhammad Fuad Abdul Baqi, Al-Mu’jam al-Mufahras li al-Alfadh al-Qur’an
al-Karim, Beirut: Dar Ihya al-Turats al Arai, 1945.
19 Natsir’s religious and political thoughts can be
reconstructed through his works, especially Islam sebagai Dasar
Negara, Bandung: Pimpinan Fraksi Masyumi dalam Konstituante,
1957; Capita Celecta, Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1973.
20 See Djohan Effendi, “The Contribution of Islamic
Parties to the Decline of Democracy in the 1950.” Unpublished paper,
no year.
21 The typology of disunified elite and consensually
unified elite is taken from Michel Burton, Richard Gunther, and John
Higley, “Introduction: Elite Transformation and Democratic Regimes,"
in John Higley and Richard Gunther (eds.), Elite and Democratic
Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 10-13.
22 For more information, see Herbert Feith, The
Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1962.
23 See, for example, Mohtar Mas’oed, Ekonomi dan
Struktur Politik Orde Baru 1966-1971, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1989.
24 For more information, see Bahtiar Effendy,
Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam
di Indonesia, Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998.
25 See, for example, Bosco Carvallo and Dasrizal
(eds.), Aspirasi Umat Islam Indonesia, Jakarta: Leppenas,
1983.
26 Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern
World.
Bahtiar Effendy, Ph.D. is a lecturer at the Graduate School
of UIN (Islamic State University) Jakarta and at the Graduate
School of Universitas Muhammadiyah Jakarta. Born in Ambarawa,
Semarang, Central Java on December 10, 1958, he earned his
bachelor’s degree from the Department of Islamic Jurisprudence, IAIN
(Islamic State Institute) Jakarta (1986), earned his MA in Southeast
Asian Studies from Ohio University, USA (1988), as well as an MA in
Political Science (1991) and Ph.D. in Political Science (1994) from
Ohio State University, in the United States. With Fachry Ali, he
co-authored Merambah Jalan Baru Islam (Clearing a New
Islamic Path; Mizan, 1988). His dissertation has been translated
into Indonesian with the title Islam dan Negara (Islam and
the State) and published by Paramadina (1998). The Vice Director
of Lembaga Studi dan Pengembangan Etika Usaha Indonesia (LSPEUI/Foundation
for the Study and Development of Indonesian Business Ethics), he is
active as a panelist in seminars, both in Indonesia and abroad, and
is a prolific author of op-ed pieces and articles that frequently
appear in Indonesian newspapers, magazines and journals.
Printer Friendly Version of This Page
